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Tipping is an important phenomenon, both because of its economic magnitude and because 
of the insights it suggests about economic behavior in general. It is closely related to several 
areas in economics, including labor economics, industrial organization, social economics, 
behavioral economics, and public policy. Unfortunately, no published article integrates and 
synthesizes the research on tipping. This makes it hard for scholars to get an overview of this 
research area without reading dozens of articles. The purpose of this article is therefore to give 
the readers the state of the art in the research on tipping. In addition to summarizing and 
synthesizing the previous research on tipping, the article includes many original ideas and 
suggests topics for future research. 
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Tipping is an important phenomenon, both because of its economic magnitude and because 
of the insights it suggests about economic behavior in general. Future service considerations 
cannot explain tipping by one-time customers, and thus tipping is a phenomenon that 
demonstrates the importance of psychological and social motivations in economic behavior, as it 
is inconsistent with the assumption of selfish agents. People tip mainly because it is the social 
norm and because stiffing (not tipping) causes negative feelings such as embarrassment and 
guilt. Social norms and feelings are also major motivations for other economic behaviors, such as 
gift giving and donations. Therefore, better understanding of tipping may also provide insights 
about other economic phenomena. 
Moreover, tipping is important by itself as well. Tips in US restaurants alone are around $26 
billion a year (Azar, 2003a). This number does not include tips in other establishments such as 
hotels and taxis, and it refers to the United States alone; annual worldwide tips are therefore 
much higher. In addition, millions of workers, especially in restaurants but in other 
establishments as well, depend heavily on tip income.
1 Tipping has become prevalent in 
numerous occupations: Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993), for example, consider 33 service 
professions that are tipped.
2 In fact, tipping is much more than a single phenomenon, and 
                                                 
1 Full-service restaurants in the United States alone employ 3.8 million workers (U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States: 2001, Table No. 1263; the numbers for 2001 are a projection). Many of these workers 
derive a significant portion of their income, often most of it, from tips. 
2 The lion’s share of the literature is about tipping in restaurants, which is the most common form of tipping. Most of 
the findings and ideas discussed in the article, however, are applicable to tipping in other situations as well.  
 
 
1different forms of tipping have very different characteristics: Azar (2002a), for example, divides 
tipping occasions into six categories: reward-tipping, price-tipping, tipping-in advance, bribery-
tipping, holiday-tipping and gift-tipping, and discusses the economics of each category. 
Tipping has implications to several fields in economics and management (see Azar (2003a) 
for a detailed discussion). Being a major source of income for millions of workers, tipping has 
implications for labor economics. Tipping can be thought of as monitoring by the buyers, and the 
firm has to choose its direct monitoring according to the efficiency of tipping in motivating 
workers. Firms can also replace tips with fixed service charges. In addition, tips were recently 
suggested as a potential source of revenues for firms that post intellectual property on the 
Internet (Woodhead, 2000). These issues suggest that some aspects of tipping are related to 
industrial organization. People tip mainly because this is the social norm and violating it results 
in feelings of embarrassment and unfairness. In addition, people may tip because they derive 
utility from feeling kind and generous (i.e., tipping is a means of self-signaling and improving 
one’s self-image). Therefore, tipping is closely related to social and behavioral economics. 
Tipping also raises policy questions. Should tipped workers receive minimum wages in addition 
to their tips? Should income tax and social security payments be imposed on tips in the same 
manner that they apply to wages?  
While a lot of research was done on tipping in the last two decades, no published article 
integrates and synthesizes this research. This makes it hard for scholars to get an overview of this 
research area without reading dozens of articles. The purpose of this article is therefore to give 
the readers the state of the art in the research on tipping; I hope that some of them will find this 
topic so interesting that they will add to the growing body of literature on tipping. Therefore, in 
 
 
2addition to summarizing and synthesizing the previous research on tipping, I add many original 
ideas and suggest topics for future research. 
II.  THEORETICAL RESEARCH ABOUT TIPPING 
The first to offer an economic model of tipping were Ben-Zion and Karni (1977). They built 
a theoretical framework for a repeated interaction between a customer who chooses how much to 
tip and a service agent who chooses how much effort to provide. They showed that the marginal 
reward for effort must be positive for the service agent to provide more than the minimal effort 
level. They also proved that tips tend to be smaller when turnover of customers or service staff is 
higher and when customers visit the establishment less frequently. They concluded that tips are 
consistent with self-interest seeking behavior only for the case of repetitive customers, and that 
in order to explain why one-time customers tip one should consider altruistic behavior and social 
norms, which are not included in their model.  
Azar (2002b) does so and incorporates social norms and feelings of fairness and generosity 
in the utility function of the customer. He examines whether tipping improves service quality and 
increases social welfare. The major determinant of the resulting equilibrium is the slope of the tip 
with respect to service quality (the slopes of the social norm and of the customer’s tipping 
function turn out to be the same). When the slope is high (i.e. the norm is to tip poorly for bad 
service), tipping can serve as a good monitoring mechanism and support a high-quality 
equilibrium. The lower the slope is, the lower and farther away from social optimum is the 
resulting service quality. Except for extreme cases, however, tipping improves social welfare. 
Azar (2003b) goes further to examine not only how tipping affects the worker, but also how 
it affects the firm. He examines the optimal choice of monitoring intensity by the firm when 
 
 
3workers receive tips (or other incentives that are not firm-provided). Increase in the sensitivity of 
tips to service quality reduces optimal monitoring intensity but nevertheless increases effort and 
profits unambiguously. The model explains why US firms supported the establishment of tipping 
in the late 19
th century but raises the possibility that European firms make costly mistakes by 
replacing tips with service charges. 
Sisk and Gallick (1985) consider tips and commissions and argue that tips ultimately protect 
the buyer from an unscrupulous seller (or his agent) when the brand-name mechanism for 
assuring contractual performance is insufficient. Their analysis suggests that differences in the 
ratio of tip to the marginal cost of the service across customers do not necessarily indicate price 
discrimination, but rather may result from implicit contracting which reduces marketing or 
search costs. Schwartz (1997) shows that tipping may increase the firm’s profits when consumer 
segments differ in their demand functions and their propensity to tip. Jacob and Page (1980) 
examined a broader issue, of buyer monitoring in general, and concluded that certain firms will 
use both buyers and owners to supervise employees. Ruffle (1999) presents a theoretical model 
about gift giving and discusses briefly how the model can be applied to tipping as well. 
Azar (2002c) presents an economic model that incorporates the disutility suffered by 
customers when they disobey the tipping norm, and allow tipping to be motivated also by future 
service considerations. The model predicts that if future service is a reason for tipping, then the 
sensitivity of tips to service quality increases in patronage frequency. Surveys of restaurant 
customers, however, are inconsistent with this prediction, implying that future service is not a 
reason for tipping. Azar (2003c) discusses the reasons for tipping from another perspective. He 
presents a model of the evolution of social norms and shows that when a norm is costly to follow 
and people do not derive benefits from following it except for avoiding social disapproval, the 
 
 
4norm erodes over time. Tip percentages, however, increased over the years, suggesting that 
people derive benefits from tipping, such as impressing others and improving their self-image as 
being generous and kind.  
Several empirical papers introduced simple theoretical frameworks to help interpret their 
empirical findings. Bodvarsson and Gibson (1994) developed an economic model in which the 
customer tips according to the service quality, quantity, and the probability of transacting with 
the server in the future. The server has two supply functions, one for quantity of service and the 
other for service quality. These functions depend on the expected tip, the server’s opportunity 
costs, and the probability the server assigns to serving the customer in the future. The 
equilibrium is not solved for, however. Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) adopted a different 
theoretical approach, modeling the tipping event by means of a game theoretic model in which 
the customer’s payoff is a function of whether he tips and whether others tip. Conlin, Lynn and 
O’Donoghue (2003) describe the tipping event as an interaction between a waiter and a 
customer, where the customer’s utility depends on the deviation of his tip from the norm. Their 
paper focuses on testing empirically whether the social norm of tipping resembles the efficient 
contract that waiters and customers would want to sign in the absence of the large transaction 
costs involved. They find that tipping exhibits elements of efficiency but is not fully efficient. 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ABOUT TIPPING 
Most of the literature about tipping is empirical, about tipping in restaurants, and consisted 
of two main types of papers: in one, waiters cooperate with the researcher, behave in a certain 
way (for example, squat when they introduce themselves) and record the effect of different 
behaviors on tips. In the second common paper type, the researcher interviews customers as they 
 
 
5leave the restaurant and records certain variables (bill size, tip size, service quality and group 
size are often included, in addition to other variables), and analyzes how different variables 
affect the tip size.  
It is worthwhile to mention that while most of the studies are based on small datasets (about 
100-200 customers each), several papers are based on much larger datasets and therefore their 
conclusions may be more valid. These papers include Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997), which is 
based on a dataset of 697 customers in seven Minnesota restaurants
3, the meta-analysis by Lynn 
and McCall (2000) that combines seven published and six unpublished studies involving 2547 
dining parties at 20 different restaurants, and Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) that includes 
1998 observations from 39 restaurants in Houston, Texas.
4 
Another method used by a few empirical studies is to ask people hypothetical questions 
about their tipping behavior under certain conditions (e.g. Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1999). Also 
interesting are the experiments reported in Ruffle (1998), in which the participants acted in a way 
that resembles tipping in dictator and ultimatum games. Another interesting approach is to try to 
gain insights about tipping from its history, as Azar (2003d) does: based on the early history of 
tipping, he tries to answer why people tip, and whether tipping induces higher service quality. He 
concludes that the reasons for tipping changed somewhat over the years, but conforming to 
social norms and avoiding embarrassment were generally the main reasons. Tipping seems to 
improve service quality, though the extent of the improvement varies across occupations. 
                                                 
3 Unless noted otherwise, I report their results from the first column of table 5.  
4 Unless noted otherwise, I report the results from Table 3, column (5). 
 
 
6An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare; 
Azar (2003e) addresses it empirically by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped 
occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker’s income and consumer’s 
monitoring ability and positively with consumer’s income and closeness between the worker and 
consumer. The results refute a common belief stating that tipping exists when it lowers 
monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and 
compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service. Considering the utility 
consumers derive from improved self-esteem, tipping emerges where it increases welfare. 
In the rest of this section I review the findings of many studies about tipping and divide the 
discussion according to different variables that might affect tipping. Since many papers discuss 
the relationships between tip size and several other variables, the exposition will be much clearer 
by discussing one variable at a time rather than one study at a time. In several cases I add my 
own analysis to the empirical evidence, especially when the evidence suggests insights about the 
fundamental question of why people tip. 
Service Quality 
Whether service quality plays a role in the determination of tip size is one of the most 
important questions, since the answer to this question may imply whether or not tipping serves 
its presumed purpose, namely to encourage workers to render excellent service. If it is the case 
that tipping is not related to the quality of service, tips no longer serve as an incentive to provide 
excellent service. It is not clear then what advantage tipping has over fixed service charges.  
Lynn and McCall (2000) found statistically significant and positive relationship between 
service evaluations and tip sizes; the effect of service on tips was small, however, accounting for 
 
 
7less than two percents of the variability in tip percentages.
5 They also discovered that tipping was 
not significantly related to servers’ or third-parties’ evaluations of the service. This result is very 
important as it might drive servers to think that tips are not related to the service quality they 
provide, eliminating their incentive to exert effort and resulting in inefficiency of tipping as an 
instrument to improve service quality. In order to support a causality argument, i.e. that 
customers tip more for good service, the study examines and refutes three alternative 
explanations for the positive correlation between service quality and tip size. Lynn and Graves 
(1996) also find a positive but correlation but small in magnitude between tips and service 
evaluation. 
Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) found that each extra point on a service measure 
scale of 1-5 adds 1.49 to the tip percentage (i.e. increases the tip in 1.49 percent of bill size). This 
service measure is consisted of five different characteristics of the waiter (ranked by the 
customers): appearance, knowledge, friendliness, speed of service and attentiveness. When 
considering each of the components separately, however, friendliness and speed of service have 
statistically significant positive coefficients (1.65 and 1.46), while appearance and attentiveness 
have negative coefficients that are not statistically significant, and knowledge has statistically 
significant negative coefficient (−1.05).
6 The latter result is surprising, as it suggests that diners 
tip less when they consider their waiter more knowledgeable.  
                                                 
5 They mention, however, that in the studies that used customer ratings of service on multi-item scales (which are 
more valid and reliable), this number approached 5%. 
6 Based on Table 3, column 1. 
 
 
8Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) found positive correlation between service quality and tip 
size in five out of seven restaurants (in three the correlation was statistically significant), but 
negative correlation in two restaurants. Combining the results from all restaurants, those who 
valued the service as 5/5 tipped 0.44 percent of bill size more than those who ranked the service 
as lower (usually 4/5). Similarly, Lynn and Grassman (1990) found positive correlation between 
service ratings and tip size. Rogelberg, Ployhart, Balzer and Yonker (1999) found that service 
quality affected tipping decisions of college students in some cases. Lynn and Simons (2000) 
interviewed waiters about their characteristics and examined their tip earnings in lunches and 
dinners, and found that better service providers can earn higher tips in evenings but not at lunch.  
Several studies suggest that service quality is a major determinant of tips, contradicting 
others that imply that service affects tips very little (for example Lynn and McCall, 2000; 
Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1997). Lynn (2001) reports about a national survey, in which 54.5% of 
respondents claimed that the best explanation for why they do or do not tip restaurant waiters had 
to do with the quality of the service received. No other explanation was near this level of 
endorsement. This result should be taken cautiously, however, since research shows that people 
are poor at identifying the causes of their own actions (Lynn, 2001). Moreover, self-justification 
may contribute to the result as well. To illustrate this point, suppose that a customer who leaves a 
restaurant without tipping is asked by a researcher why he did not tip. He is likely to answer that 
the service was poor, not that he is mean or that he does not intend to visit this restaurant again 
and therefore has no incentive to tip. To a large extent, the same applies to a survey that asks 
people why they do or do not tip waiters in general.  
 
 
9Bodvarsson and Gibson (1999) conducted interviews with students in two universities
7. In 
St. Cloud State University in Minnesota students reported that they would tip 6, 13.1 and 19.1 
percent for poor, satisfactory and very good service. In the University of Lethbridge in Alberta 
the numbers were 3.7, 11.4 and 18.4 percent. Comparing these results with those of studies that 
interview diners after actual dining experiences (in which the effect of service quality on tips is 
minimal, not more than 2-3 percent of the bill size in general) is puzzling. Why are the results so 
different? One explanation I want to suggest is that people would like to tip according to the 
service quality. When asked about it hypothetically, they therefore indicate a large sensitivity of 
tips to service quality. When faced with an actual tipping situation, however, the social pressure 
and the embarrassment that one feels when he tips poorly bring people to tip for poor service 
more than they thought they would tip when asked about it hypothetically. This explanation is 
supported by the results of an on-line poll conducted on www.tipping.org: on the question “Do 
you feel pressured to tip at a restaurant even if you feel you received bad service?” 70 percent (of 
3332 respondents) answered positively. Yet, if people are fully rational, they should expect to be 
pressured to tip even for bad service. The difference between their hypothetical tipping behavior 
and their observed behavior may therefore be a result of bounded rationality: even though most 
people experience tipping frequently, they still think they would tip differently then they 
eventually do.  
                                                 




10Finally, not all studies find positive correlation between quality and tips: Lynn and Latane 
(1984) observed in two studies that tipping was not related to service quality or to waitperson’s 
efforts.  
Patronage Frequency 
Lynn and McCall (2000) and Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) found significant and 
positive correlation between patronage frequency and tip size. Lynn and Grassman (1990) found 
correlation between patronage frequency and tip size, and also between tip size and the 
interaction of bill size with patronage frequency. They did not find, however, correlation 
between tipping and the interaction of patronage frequency with service ratings. Bodvarsson and 
Gibson (1994) and Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) also did not find correlation between 
tips and the interaction of patronage frequency with service quality. That is, the tips given by 
frequent patrons are not more or less sensitive to service quality than those given by others. If 
one assumes that the waiters are aware of the service quality they provide, frequent patrons have 
an incentive to discipline the waiters by tipping poorly for bad service. Since they do not do so 
more than non-frequent customers, it implies that receiving good service in the future is not a 
major reason for why people tip.  
Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) found in all seven restaurants that regular customers (who 
patronized the restaurant at least once a month) tip more than non-regular patrons, but in only 
two of the seven restaurants the difference was statistically significant. On average, regular 
patrons tipped 1.05 percents more (of bill size) than others. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 
(1986) interviewed people over the phone with two alternative questions. One question was “If 
the service is satisfactory, how much of a tip do you think most people leave after ordering a 
 
 
11meal costing $10 in a restaurant that they visit frequently?” and the other question started the 
same but ended “… in a restaurant on a trip to another city that they do not expect to visit 
again?” The mean responses were $1.28 and $1.27 (the number of observations was 122 and 
124). These answers indicate that people do not think that repeated customers tip more. 
Bill Size 
This is clearly the least controversial variable. Since tips in restaurants are usually computed 
as a percentage of the bill, it is not surprising that tip size is positively correlated with bill size. A 
few examples to papers that explicitly get this result empirically are Freeman, Walker, Borden 
and Latane (1975), Lynn and Grassman (1990), and Rogelberg, Ployhart, Balzer and Yonker 
(1999). Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) conclude, “The bill size is most important in determining 
the tip,” and obtain a coefficient of 0.14 for the bill size in a regression of tip (in dollars) on bill 
size and other variables.  
The more interesting question regarding the bill size is not whether it affects the amount of 
tips, but rather if it affects percentage of tips, and if yes, in what direction (i.e., is the tip amount 
a linear, a concave or a convex function of bill size?). Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) 
found that bill size affects percentage tip negatively. Similar result was obtained by Chapman 
and Winquist (1998), who examined the percentage of tips for restaurant meals, haircuts and taxi 
rides, and observed that smaller bills were associated with larger tip percentage.  
There are two potential explanations for the latter result. First, reducing the tip percentage 
has higher benefit for the customer when the bill is high, so he might tend to tip smaller 
percentages when the bill is large. Second, suppose that many people tip by computing 15 
percent of the bill (or any other constant percentage) and then rounding up the result to the next 
 
 
12integer amount (or to the next integer amount plus the small change they received when paying 
the bill). Since the dollar amount people round up is the same regardless of bill size, tip 
percentage is higher for smaller bills.  
Service Quantity 
Service quantity has no clear definition, but is generally assumed to reflect the amount of 
time the waiter dedicates to the table. As such, it is sometimes approximated by the number of 
dishes ordered in the table (by all diners together). If customers compensate waiters in proportion 
to their effort, tips should be positively correlated with service quantity. Clearly, when estimating 
the effect of service quantity on tips, one must control for the bill size, as the two are highly 
correlated. 
Lynn and Grassman (1990) did not find a correlation between the number of courses and 
tipping. Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) found statistically significant correlation between service 
quantity and amount tipped, but the effect of service quantity is very close to zero. Conlin, Lynn 
and O'Donoghue (2003) found positive correlation between the number of courses in the meal 
(per diner) and the percentage tip; the coefficient, however, is not statistically significant.  
Group Size 
If diners see how much is tipped by the other people at the same table, bigger group can lead 
to increased social pressure to tip and higher tips. If they do not, however, and there are multiple 
customers who pay the bill, each one might want to free ride on the tips of others and reduce his 
tip (when the waiter only sees the total tip and not its division among the customers). The 
empirical evidence about the effect of group size on tips in mixed. 
 
 
13Lynn and Grassman (1990) found no correlation between group size and tipping. Freeman, 
Walker, Borden and Latane (1975) examined 396 groups of restaurant diners and concluded that 
the variation around the norm of 15 percent tip was an inverse power function of group size, i.e. 
there exists a negative correlation between group size and tip. They claim that the findings are 
consistent with a theory of division of responsibility. There is another potential explanation, 
however: customers take into account that it is easier to serve a large group than to serve the 
same number of people in separate tables, therefore tipping less when they are in a large group 
(Snyder, 1976).  
Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) get an opposite result: percentage tip in their data is 
positively correlated with group size. Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) found that the differences 
in tip percentage between tables of two, three and four diners are not significant, but that lone 
diners tip more than others. This, however, may be the result of customers computing 15 percent 
and rounding up the result, as was explained in the discussion about bill size. Indeed, in the 
regression where tip amount (rather than percentage) is the dependent variable, the result that 
lone diners tip more is not statistically significant.  
Differences between Countries 
One of the puzzling questions about tipping is how it becomes a social norm in some 
countries but not in others. What are the characteristics of a country that make tipping more 
likely to be prevalent there? A few studies addressed this question. Lynn (2000) found 
relationships between the number of tipped professions and national characteristics (positive 
relationship with level of extraversion and neuroticism and negative with level of psychoticism) 
in a sample of 21 countries. Similarly, Lynn (1994) concludes that tipping is more prevalent the 
 
 
14higher the country’s level of neuroticism
8. Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993) looked at tipping 
practices for 33 service professions in 30 countries and found that tipping was less prevalent in 
countries with low tolerance for interpersonal status and power differences and in countries with 
values that emphasize social over economic relationships. Tipping was more prevalent in 
countries with low tolerance for uncertainty and in communistic countries that valued close 
employee ties to work organizations.  
Interpersonal Connection with the Server 
Davis, Schrader, Richardson, Kring and Kieffer (1998) found that significantly higher tips 
were given when the server squatted rather than stood. The hypothesis behind this result is that 
when servers squat, they are closer to the customer, which may allow additional eye contact and 
foster higher rapport and enhanced communication. Lynn and Mynier (1993) corroborated the 
hypothesis that squatting during the initial visit to the table increases the waiter’s tip. Garrity and 
Degelman (1990) used data from 42 two-person dining parties in a brunch buffet and found that 
when the server introduced herself by name the tip increased from 15% to 23.4%. Stephen and 
Zweigenhaft (1986) tested the effect on tipping of a female waitress touching the male customer, 
the female customer or neither of them, using data from 112 pairs of restaurant customers. 
Average tips were 13, 15 and 11 percent, respectively. Rogelberg, Ployhart, Balzer and Yonker, 
(1999) found that server friendliness affected tipping in some cases. 
Crusco and Wetzel (1984) report on an experiment in which three waitresses briefly touched 
customers either on the hand or the shoulder as they were returning change. Customers’ reactions 
                                                 
8 Neuroticism is strongly correlated with “embarrassability”, shame, self-consciousness and anxiety. 
 
 
15were assessed by a restaurant survey and the tip percentage. The tipping rate for the two types of 
touch did not differ from each other and did not differ according to the customer’s gender. Both 
tipping rates were significantly larger than a control, no-touch group. There were no touch 
effects on ratings of the waitress, the restaurant’s atmosphere, or the dining experience. Crusco 
and Wetzel concluded that touch effects can occur without awareness. Conlin, Lynn and 
O’Donoghue (2003) found that friendliness was the server’s characteristic that had the most 
effect on tips.  
The above results suggest that people tip more, sometimes significantly, when the waiter 
behaves in a way that increases the interpersonal connection between him and the customer. The 
reason for this tipping behavior is probably that people feel more uncomfortable to tip poorly, 
and more willing to tip generously, when they feel close to the waiter (from the same reason that 
one is more likely to help a friend than to help a stranger). This can be consistent with both social 
pressure and fairness as explanations for tipping: the customer might incur increased social 
pressure and more disutility from being unfair when he feels closer to the server. However, the 
significance of the closeness to the server is not consistent with future service being a major 
reason for tipping. 
Related to the above are experiments in which the effect of some friendly act of the waiter is 
recorded. Rind and Bordia (1995) conducted an experiment in which a female server wrote on 
the back of diners’ checks “thank you”, “thank you” plus her first name, or nothing. The addition 
of “thank you” increased tip percentages, although personalization by adding the first name had 
no effect. Gueguen and Legoherel (2000) found that drawing of the sun on a bill led clients to tip 
more often and larger amounts. The data included 177 clients who ordered espresso coffee in 
bars. Since tipping in this situation is less common than in restaurants, the effects of the same 
 
 
16behavior by a restaurant waiter may be substantially reduced, however. Rind and Strohmetz 
(1999) found that writing a helpful message about an upcoming dinner special on the backs of 
the checks increased tips from 17 to 20 percent. 
Variables Not Controlled by the Waiter 
It is interesting to examine the effects of variables that affect the enjoyment from the dining 
experience but are not under the control of the waiter. If people tip to receive good service in the 
future, they should not reward or punish the waiter for factors that he cannot control. If tipping 
occurs because of social pressure or willingness of customers to be fair, the correlation of tips 
with such factors depends on what the social norm dictates in this aspect. In addition, if the 
customer’s generosity is affected by his mood, he may tip more when his overall experience is 
better, even when the improved experience is not caused by the waiter’s actions.  
The main variable that affects the dining experience but is usually not controlled by the 
waiter is food quality (as ranked by the customer). Unless the server is so slow that he brings the 
food cold, or recommends a dish that the customer later dislikes, the waiter has no effect on food 
quality. Therefore, the customer should not tip according to food quality if his tips are a function 
of the waiter’s effort, but may tip less when food quality is low if his tips depend on his mood. 
The evidence is not unanimous, however. Lynn and McCall (2000) found significant positive 
correlation between tip size and food ratings, while Lynn and Grassman (1990) and Lynn and 
Latane (1984) found no such correlation. Conlin, Lynn and O’Donoghue (2003) found positive 
and statistically significant correlation between food ratings and tips in some of their 
specifications, but once patronage frequency is included in the regression, the coefficient on food 
quality drops to half of its previous size and is not statistically significant anymore. Since the 
 
 
17regression results show that frequent patrons tip more, and they are presumably also those who 
evaluate the food better on average (this may be the reason why they go to the restaurant often), 
without controlling for patronage frequency the food quality coefficient might be biased 
upwards. Therefore, the latter result, where the coefficient is not statistically significant, seems to 
be more valid.  
Rogelberg, Ployhart, Balzer and Yonker (1999) found that food quality affected tipping 
decisions of college students in some cases, but restaurant cleanliness and atmosphere did not. 
Harris (1995) found that food quality was related to tip size according to questionnaires given to 
waiters but not according to customers’ responses. This is an interesting result as it implies some 
kind of bounded rationality in at least one side. If tips are not correlated with food quality, then it 
might suggest that waiters, consciously or not, prefer to attribute tip variance to reasons that are 
not under their control (such as food quality), rather than to admit that sometimes they give poor 
service that results in lower tips. If tips are in fact correlated with food quality, then customers 
have some sort of bias, as they claim the two are not related.  
Seligman, Finegan, Hazlewood and Wilkinson (1985) conducted an experiment with pizza 
deliverymen, in which customers were told that the pizza would arrive early or late, and were 
induced to think either that the deliveryman is responsible for the waiting time or that he is not. 
When customers thought the deliveryman is responsible for the delay, they tipped more for early 
delivery, but when they thought he does not control the delay, they tipped the same for early and 
late delivery.  
 
 
18Factors that Affect Tips in Restaurants  - Summary 
The average tip is very close to the norm of 15 percent of bill size. Bill size is by far the 
most important variable in determining tips. Service quality affects tips positively but very little 
(the difference between mediocre and good service results in tip differences of about 0.5 – 2.5 
percent of the bill size). Patronage frequency has a small positive effect on tips. The interaction 
between patronage frequency and service quality, however, does not affect tips, which might 
suggest (if waiters correctly evaluate the service quality they provide – a false assumption 
according to Lynn and McCall, 2000) that future service is not a reason for tipping. Service 
quantity seems not to be a significant determinant of tip size, despite some conflicting evidence. 
Group size effect is not clear, since the evidence about it is not unanimous. This is an interesting 
factor to explore further because it can suggest whether the common practice of restaurants to 
impose a fixed-percentage gratuity instead of tips on large groups (usually six or more diners) is 
profit maximizing. The characteristics of the population in a country help to predict how 
common tipping is in that country. Server’s friendliness and interpersonal connection with the 
customer contributes significantly to tips. The effect on tips of variables that the waiter does not 
control is mixed. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Tipping is an important phenomenon, both because of its economic magnitude and because 
of the insights it suggests about how social norms and feelings motivate economic behavior in 
general. Different aspects of tipping are related to several areas in economics. In this paper I 
provide a summary of the research in this area, along with many original ideas.  
 
 
19Tipping provides many promising research opportunities. One interesting topic is how the 
norm of tipping evolves. When do we start to tip workers that were not tipped before? Are there 
reasons that cause us to stop tipping in certain situations? How does tipping in one country affect 
the custom in another country?
9 Another question worth pursuing is why tips are expected in 
certain situations but not in others. Why do we tip waiters but not flight attendants? Why don’t 
we tip our lawyers and accountants when we are satisfied with the service they provide us?  
Some policy issues arise as well. Should tips be taxed the same way that wages are? Should 
tipped workers be paid minimum wage in addition to their tips?
10 I hope that this article will 
encourage additional researchers to contribute to the growing literature about tipping. 
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